Practical Evaluation of DPA Countermeasures on Reconfigurable Hardware
Amir Moradi, Oliver Mischke, Christof Paar
IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST 2011), San Diego, California, USA, June 5-6, 2011, pages 154-160.
Abstract
In CHES 2010 a correlation-based power analysis collision attack has been introduced which is supposed to exploit any first-order leakage of cryptographic devices. This work examines the effectiveness of the well-known DPA countermeasures versus the correlation collision attack. The considered countermeasures include masking, shuffling, and noise addition, when applied in hardware. Practical evaluations, which all have been performed using power traces measured from an FPGA board, show an increase in the number of required traces, e.g. from 10,000 to 1,500,000, when combining different countermeasures. This study allows for a fair comparison between the hardware countermeasures and helps identifying an appropriate key lifetime.
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