On the Power of Power Analysis in the Real World: A Complete Break of the KeeLoq Code Hopping Scheme

Thomas Eisenbarth, Timo Kasper, Amir Moradi, Chris­tof Paar, Mahmoud Salmasizadeh, Mohammad T. Manzuri Shalmani

28th International Cryptology Conference -- CRYPTO 2008. Santa Barbara, California, USA. August 17-21, 2008.


Abstract

KeeLoq remote keyless entry systems are widely used for access control purposes such as garage openers or car door systems. We present the first successful differential power analysis attacks on numerous commercially available products employing KeeLoq code hopping. Our new techniques combine side-channel cryptanalysis with specific properties of the KeeLoq algorithm. They allow for efficiently revealing both the secret key of a remote transmitter and the manufacturer key stored in a receiver. As a result, a remote control can be cloned from only ten power traces, allowing for a practical key recovery in few minutes. After extracting the manufacturer key once, with similar techniques, we demonstrate how to recover the secret key of a remote control and replicate it from a distance, just by eavesdropping on at most two messages. This key-cloning without physical access to the device has serious realworld security implications, as the technically challenging part can be outsourced to specialists. Finally, we mount a denial of service attack on a KeeLoq access control system. All proposed attacks have been verified on several commercial KeeLoq products.

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